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ABSTRACT
One common way in which abuse of dominance cases could lead to action restricting
Intellectual Property (IP) law is where an IP right holder’s refusal to deal
inordinately restricts the development of competition. According to Section 2 of the
Sherman Act and Article 82 of the EC, both US and EU law intervene with regard to
de facto monopoly in refusal to deal cases based on an exclusive IP right “under
exceptional circumstances.” The US and EU face the same legal problem and handle
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it basically with the same principles. Yet courts on both sides of the Atlantic have not
used a common language until now. The courts still do not use any economic
arguments. The proposed common language that follows could be applied by the
courts on both sides of the Atlantic for refusal to deal cases. This language consists
of commonly understood legal terms and economic analysis and includes two
cumulative steps. First, the courts should examine the “possibility of competition by
substitution” and whether a “de facto monopoly on the downstream market” exists.
These should be the first two criteria to find an anti-competitive abuse of IP rights.
The second step of the proposed analysis consists of an economic balancing between
the pro- and anti-competitive effects of the refusal of the IP owner to deal.
Convergence could bring some legal certainty in this area of law, especially through
application of the proposed two-step test, and would become an example for the
resolution of refusal to deal cases at the interface of IP and competition law for
developing countries.

A. Introduction
The prevailing view nowadays is that antitrust law by protecting competition,
and intellectual property law, by rewarding innovation, each create incentives to
introduce new products. At the highest level of analysis, intellectual property rights
(IPRs) 1 complement competition policies because they each share a concern to
promote technical progress to the ultimate benefit of consumers (i.e., the theory of
complementarity). 2 Under the theory of complementarity, the intervention of

* The author has studied law in Greece and then wrote his Ph.D. in Munich, Germany on European
unfair competition law. He has been scholar of the Max-Planck-Institute for Intellectual Property and
Competition law in Munich and the Fulbright Foundation in the scope of his research in the US. He is
now practicing law in Greece. The author would like to thank from this position Prof. Graeme
Dinwoodie and Prof. David Gerber of the Chicago-Kent College of Law for their help, advice and
valuable contribution to the writing and publication of this article. I also owe special thanks to the
Fulbright Foundation for giving me the financial support and opportunity to do my research for a whole
year in Chicago.
1
The present thesis focuses mainly on the exclusive rights of copyright and patent law with regard to
IPR and not on trademark rights.
2
See Atari Games v. Nintendo of America Inc. 897 F. 2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The two
bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and
competition”). The Technology Guidelines (Commission Notice – Guidelines on the application of
Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology transfer agreements, 2004 O.J. (C 101/03) ¶7) recognize that
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competition laws apparently depends on effects of a given IP right and its exercise in
the market. The IP system rests on the idea of long-term innovation incentives. That is
entirely consistent with antitrust policy related to exclusionary conduct, which also
focuses on dynamic competition and long-term effects. Firms are more likely to
innovate if they are at least somewhat protected against free-riding. They are also
more likely to innovate if they face strong competition. The right holder is enabled to
prevent competitors from exploiting the very subject matter of protection, but may not
prohibit the development and use of competing technology. Thus, IPRs exclude only
competition by imitation but further competition by substitution. 3
The most common ways in which abuse of dominance cases could lead to
action restricting IP law are when an IPR holder’s refusal to deal inordinately restricts
the development of competition. First, there is a general category of dominance which
applies to undertakings in a powerful position in a market where some effective
competition continues to exist. Second, there is a special extreme form of dominance,
a de facto monopoly, where the competitor has factually no alternatives to compete. 4
However, even when an IP protected product reaches the status of a de facto
monopoly and falls within the scope of Section 2 of the Sherman Act or Article 82 of
the EC, merely achieving that status is not itself viewed as abusive. A firm that has
achieved a de facto monopoly by virtue of its investment in R&D and IP protection is
generally intellectual property and competition law are not in conflict; on the contrary “both bodies of
law share the same basic objective of promoting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of
resources. Innovation constitutes an essential and dynamic component of an open and competitive
market economy. Intellectual property rights promote dynamic competition by encouraging
undertakings to invest in developing new or improved products and processes. So does competition by
putting pressure on undertakings to innovate. Therefore, both intellectual property rights and
competition are necessary to promote innovation and ensure a competitive exploitation thereof”. See
also M. Howard Morse, Standard Setting and Antitrust: The Intersection Between IP Rights and the
Antitrust Laws, IP LITIGATOR, May-Jun. 2003, 17, 18.
3
Hanns Ullrich, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht im Gemeinsamen Markt, in EGWETTBEWERBSRECHT, KOMMENTAR [EEC Competition Right, Comment], 1101, 1101-14 (Ulrich
Immenga & Hans-Joachim Mestmäcker eds, 1997); Josef Drexl, IMS Health and Trinko – Antitrust
Placebo for Consumers Instead of Sound Economics in Refusal-to-Deal Cases, 35 IIC 788, 805 (2004).
4
See Part E. III.
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normally entitled to continue to compete by exercising its exclusionary rights even in
aftermarkets. 5
However, there are cases where the abuse of a dominant position in the
upstream market that is being facilitated by the IP right can be “transferred” to the
neighboring downstream market. This occurs when the competition is eliminated in
the downstream market because of the refusal of the IP right holder to license its right
to competitors. 6 European law especially has always started with the assumption that
the leveraging of dominant positions into other markets may constitute an abuse if
success on the neighboring market is not based on competition on the merits. 7
Conduct can be abusive if it is characterized by an instrumental use of the economic
power bestowed by the dominant position to gain commercial advantages, usually on
adjacent markets. Abuses in this category can also be referred to as market power
leveraging abuses. 8 The two most important variants are tying and refusals to grant
access to a necessary input for downstream activities. 9
According to Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Art. 82 EC , both US and EU
law intervene in de facto monopoly in refusal to deal cases based on an exclusive IP
right “under exceptional circumstances.” 10 Yet courts on both sides of the Atlantic do
not use a common language until now, although facing the same legal problem and
5

Steven Anderman, Does the Microsoft Case offer a New Paradigm for the ‘Exceptional
Circumstances’ Test and Compulsory Copyright Licenses under EC Competition Law? 1(2)
Competition L. Rev. 1, 9 (2004).
6
RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 200-201 (5th ed. 2003); ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMAECKER &
HEIKE SCHWEITZER, EUROPAEISCHES WETTBEWERBSRECHT (2d ed., 2004), § 18, nr. 19; Case T-83/91,
Tetra Pak Int’l Sa v. Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. II-755.
7
ULRICH IMMENGA, ET AL., EG-WETTBEWERBSRECHT [EEC COMPETITION RIGHTS], 765 (1997).
8
AXEL BECKMERHAGEN, DIE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE IM US-AMERIKANISCHEN UND
EUROPAEISCHEN KARTELLRECHT, 140 (2002).
9
See Thomas Eilmansberger, How to Distinguish Good From Bad Competition Under Art. 82 EC, 42
COMMON MKT L. REV. 129, 155 (2005).
10
See among others CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), , aff’g In re Indep.
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D. Kan. 2000), reh’g denied, No. 99-1323, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 9987, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001); Case C-418/01, Ims Health GMBH v.
NDC Health GMBH, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039. See also STEVEN D. ANDERMAN, EC COMPETITION LAW
AND IP RIGHTS, p. 173 (1998).
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handling it basically with the same principles (e.g. they do not presume market power
from IP rights as such). Moreover, they do not use any economic arguments at all,
although the US law facilitates an economic efficiency test and the EU law intends to
adopt an economic approach for the application of Art. 82 EC (Part E. II.).
This article points out the common legal approaches of the US and EU law
systems, handling refusal to deal cases with regard to IP rights. Part B analyzes the
presumption of market power from IP rights as such. It then reveals how the US and
EU courts have approached the “exceptional circumstances” criteria for the abuse of
IP rights in monopoly situation cases (Part C and D). Part E ascertains that the US and
EU courts do not use economic arguments at all (E. IV.) and dictates the possibility of
using common – from both sides understandable – legal terms (E. III., IV, V and VI.)
for the definition of the “exceptional circumstances” and the resolution of such cases
(E. VII.).
B. IP Rights and the Presumption of Market Power Thereof
I. General Rule
Market power is the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict output.
Market power typically is associated with a departure from the conditions necessary
for the optional functioning of a market: sufficient number of buyers or sellers,
relatively easy conditions of entry and exit, or readily accessible information on
market conditions. Intellectual property law potentially confers market power because
it creates barriers to competitors’ entry into the relevant market with the same good
and, to a certain extent, with substitute goods. The degree of market power is a
function not only of how unique or socially desirable the product is, but also of how
effective the property right is in erecting entry barriers that keep substitutes out of the
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market. Antitrust is not opposed to market power, as such, if it is necessary to achieve
efficiencies and respects the need for incentives for investment in research and
development. If a firm builds market power through innovation, investment and
marketing activities, this is perfectly legal. 11 Market power is less durable in markets
characterized by a high level of innovation and therefore by dependence on IP rights.
Intellectual property cannot be presumed to establish market power. 12 While
intellectual property grants exclusive rights, these rights are not monopolies in the
economic sense. They do not necessarily provide a large share of any commercial
market and they do not necessarily lead to the ability to raise prices in a market.
Where products are differentiated, a company can have constrained market power
without being a monopolist. This is particularly likely in markets in which IP rights
are important. 13 An IP right may actually prove so successful that it creates a market
dominant position. However, such a position is not the result of IP protection but of
the market situation (e.g., lock-in, network effects). 14 Market power can only be
determined by an actual economic analysis of the anti- and pro-competitive aspects of
the actual use and ownership of the specific piece of intellectual property. For
example, a single patent or a copyright especially may have dozens of close
substitutes. 15 The mere presence of an intellectual property right does not permit an
antitrust enforcer to skip the crucial steps of market definition and determining market
effects.

11

MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 35 (2004).
Debra A. Valentine, Abuse of Dominance in Relation to Intellectual Property: US Perspectives and
the INTEL Cases, 3/2000 COMPUTER L. REV. 73, 76.
13
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK LEMLEY, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, (Herbert Hovenkamp ed., 2006), §
10-9.
14
Drexl,supra note 3, at 792.
15
Ralph Jonas et al., Copyright and Trademark Misuse, 2000 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L.,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MISUSE: LICENSING AND LITIGATION 165, 184.
12
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In the view of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission,
the idea that IP rights cannot be presumed to create market power is a settled
question. 16 The ECJ adopts the same approach. In its Deutsche Grammophon
decision, 17 the ECJ observed that the exercise of exclusive distribution rights under a
sound recording copyright does not automatically translate to dominance. Rather,
there must be some further showing of effective competition over a considerable part
of the relevant market. In Magill, 18 the ECJ similarly held that mere ownership of IP
rights, without more, does not establish dominance.
Consequently, the general approach both in the US and EU is to avoid rigid
tests and instead rely on a review of the likely economic effects to the marketplace as
a whole, both in the short term and over the long term, factoring in incentives for procompetitive innovation. Moreover, the presumption of market power would
encourage routine filing of tying antitrust claims because the accusers would not need
to confront market realities. The increased risk of antitrust liability may discourage IP
right owners from enforcing their rights. Both IP law and competition law seek to
maintain dynamic, innovative markets far into the future. To that end, they properly
are willing to tolerate a degree of private reward and market power in the present day.
II. The Recent Illinois Toolwork v. Independent Ink Case of the Supreme Court
In the Independent Ink case, the Federal Circuit, which handles all direct
patent appeals in the US, held that Supreme Court precedent 19 compelled it to
16

Russell Lombardy, The Myth of Market power: Why Market Power Should not be Presumed When
Applying Antitrust Principles to the Analysis of the Tying Arrangements Involving Intellectual
Property, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 449, 450-451 (1996).
17
Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft MBH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GMBH, 1971
E.C.R. 487, 1971C.M.L.R. 631, ¶ 16.
18
Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n, 1995, E.C.R. I-743, ¶ 46.
19
HU. S. v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47 (1962)H (ruling that “when the tying product is patented or
copyrighted ... sufficiency of economic power is presumed”) , overruled by Ill HTool Works Inc. v.
Indep. Ink, Inc.H, 126 S. Ct. 1281(2006); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26
(1984) (dictum); U. S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S.610, 619 (1977) (dictum).
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conclude that a patent does raise a presumption of market power in an IP tying case.
But even the Federal Circuit disagreed with the presumption. In fact, the Federal
Circuit’s opinion invited the Supreme Court to reverse. That’s exactly what the
Supreme Court did. 20
Illinois Toolwork (ITW) manufactured printing systems made up of
piezoelectric impulse jet print heads and inks for use in packaging assembly lines.
Patents covered the print head, the ink bottle, and the connection between them.
ITW’s license required OEM customers, the assembly line manufacturers, to purchase
ink from ITW. The ITW license didn’t bind end users, though. Plaintiff claimed this
requirement constituted a tying arrangement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. The Supreme Court ruled that “[n]othing in our opinion [in Jefferson Parish]
suggested a rebuttable presumption of market power applicable to tying arrangements
involving a patent on the tying good… It described the rule that a contract to sell a
patented product on condition that the purchaser buy unpatented goods exclusively
from the patentee is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.” 21 The 1988 patent
law amendment requires “proof of market power in the relevant market” for patent
misuse defense (35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5)). The 1988 amendment invites a reappraisal of
the per se rule announced in International Salt. The Court concluded that “tying
arrangements involving patented products should be evaluated under the standards
applied in cases like Fortner II and Jefferson Parish rather than under the per se rule
applied in Morton Salt and Loew’s… Liability must be supported by proof of power
in the relevant market rather than by a mere presumption thereof.” 22
The first question the Court examined was whether the presumption of market
power in a patented product should survive as a matter of antitrust law. It determined
20

Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281, 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
Id. at 1288, 547 U.S. 28.
22
Id. at 1291, 547 U.S. 28.
21
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that “Congress, the antitrust enforcement agencies, and most economists have all
reached the conclusion that a patent does not necessarily confer market power upon
the patentee. Today, we reach the same conclusion, and therefore hold that, in all
cases involving a tying arrangement, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant has
market power in the tying product.” 23 Through this decision the Supreme Court made
clear that there is no market power presumption through the existence of patents as
such. Instead, the courts should demand real proof of such market power.
The second issue the Court considered was the presumption of per se illegality
of a tying arrangement involving a patented product and the reappraisal of the per se
rule announced in International Salt. The Court concluded that “tying arrangements
involving patented products should be evaluated under the standards applied in cases
like Fortner II and Jefferson Parish rather than under the per se rule applied in
Morton Salt and Loew’s… Liability must be supported by proof of power in the
relevant market rather than by a mere presumption thereof.” 24 Arguably, the decision
is limited to patent tying and copyright market power presumption would therefore
remain arguably intact. But the decision’s logic should extend to copyrights as well
due to legal certainty and similarity of the cases.
C. US Law
I. First Principles
How does the US legal system (Part C. I.) and its courts (C. II., III.) approach
in practice the refusal to license cases?25 Is this approach principally similar to the EU

23

Id. at 1293, 547 U.S. 28.
Id. at 1291, 547 U.S. 28.
25
It will be a rather sketchy presentation of the US refusal-to-deal cases, since the purpose of this paper
is just to show indicatively how the US courts have treated such cases. For a more lengthy analysis, see
among others Kenneth L. Glazer & Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Unilateral Refusals to Deal under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 749 (1995).
24
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one? 27 US antitrust enforcement focuses on specific anticompetitive actions, as
judged by their effects on markets and consumer welfare. In other words, US cases at
the intersection between intellectual property and antitrust law have been analyzed by
examining the impact on economic incentives to innovate and balancing them against
anticompetitive effects. There exists no quarrel with the fundamental rule that a patent
holder has no obligation to license or sell in the first instance. 28 A patent holder is not
under any general obligation to create competition against itself within the scope of its
patent. 29 Antitrust law does not itself impose an obligation to use or license
intellectual property rights, where such a refusal would violate the antitrust laws.
Further, such an obligation would conflict directly with the rights granted to an
intellectual property owner by the intellectual property laws. Thus, as a general rule
there is no antitrust obligation either to use or license a patent.
II. Refusal to Deal Cases
In Data General v. Grumman Systems Support, 30 the First Circuit confronted an
aftermarket exclusion claim. The Independent Service Organizations (ISOs) were
repairing computer hardware, and the “part” they needed access to was Data
General’s copyrighted diagnostic software. The Court created a rebuttable
presumption designed to take the copyright into account: “[w]hile exclusionary
conduct can include a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an
author’s desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively
26

See Part D.
See Part D.
28
Valentine, supra note 12, at 74; James B. Kobak, Antitrust Treatment of Refusals to License
Intellectual Property, in 2003 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 377, 392, (David Bender ed.,
Practising Law Institute 2003).
29
See, e.g., Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern Paper Bag, 210 US 405, 429 (1908); HSCM Corp. v.
Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981)H (“[W]here a patent has been lawfully acquired,
subsequent conduct permissible under the patent laws cannot trigger ... liability under the antitrust
laws.”).
30
36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). For a more analytical presentation of the refusal to deal cases in the US
see Kobak, supra note 28, at 401.
27
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valid business justification for any immediate harm to consumers”. 31 Rebuttable
presumptions offer somewhat less predictability, but permit courts to delve into the
factual context of the cases before them in order to determine competitive effect.
In its 1997 Kodak decision, the Ninth Circuit held that a refusal to license patented
parts was a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act 32 . The court reasoned that
patents may have given Kodak a monopoly on some of its parts, but by refusing to
sell the parts to independent repair technicians Kodak was effectively creating a
second monopoly in the relevant market for service. The Kodak patents on
aftermarket parts were valuable both in the market for the parts themselves and in the
complementary market for servicing photocopiers. As far as the Ninth Circuit was
concerned, this fact meant that Kodak had a duty to sell its parts. Otherwise, Kodak
would reap the advantages of monopoly in both the parts market and the service
market.
The Federal Circuit also concluded in the Xerox case 33 that a patentee can refuse
to license or sell with immunity under the antitrust laws unless one of the following
conditions applies: (1) The patent was obtained by fraud on the PTO; (2) The suit to
enforce the patent was “sham” – as that term was defined by the Supreme Court 34 ; or
(3) The patent was used as part of a tie-in strategy to extend market power beyond the
legitimate confines of the patent grant.
In Trinko, 35 the Supreme Court found that private plaintiffs did not state an
antitrust claim when they alleged a failure by communications provider Verizon to

31

Id. at 1187.
Image Tech. Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1094 (1998); see James S. Venit & John J. Kallaugher, Essential Facilities: A Comparative Law
Approach, 1994 INT’L ANTITRUST AND POL’Y: ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 315, 317 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 1994).
33
CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp., supra note 10H.H
34
HProfessional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993)H.
35
Verizon Communs. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
32
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provide adequate assistance to its rivals. “Such liability may lessen the incentive for
the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in economically beneficial facilities” and
“also requires antitrust courts to act as central planners… a role for which they are illsuited”. 36 Thus, an enforcement agency should not impose a duty to deal that it cannot
reasonably supervise because this risks assuming the day-to-day controls
characteristic of a regulatory agency. In Trinko, the Court gave a number of reasons
for refusing to impose a duty to deal. These reasons include the absence of an earlier,
voluntary business relationship between the defendant and its competitors and the
presence of an extensive regulatory framework dealing with the issues that the
plaintiff sought to have governed by the antitrust laws.
III. The Particularity of US Law with Regard to the Merger and Misuse
Doctrines
US law does not approach interface issues between Intellectual Property and
Antitrust law only through Section 2 of the Sherman Act as abuse of monopoly, but
also internally in the IP system itself through the doctrines of merger and misuse ,
which limit the legal monopoly of the IP owner. The merger doctrine states that if an
idea and the way to express it are so intertwined that the ways of expression have little
possible variation, there will not be copyright infringement, lest the copyright prevent
others from expressing the same idea (i.e., idea/expression distinction). 37
Moreover, the US courts use the misuse defense, another flexible and
powerful tool, to avoid the adverse effects of compulsory licensing on innovation. 38
Actually, defendants bring the misuse doctrine as an “aggressive” defense against the

36

Id. at 407, 414-415.
Merger
Doctrine
–
Wikipedia,
the
free
encyclopedia,
Hhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merger_doctrine. (lastH visited Jan 4, 2006)
38
Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and IP: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J., 535, 550 (2001).
37
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plaintiff who misuses an IP patent or copyright. The courts can use the flexible misuse
doctrine as a balancing tool to decide cases at the interface of intellectual property and
competition law. But such a misuse defense could not be practically applied in EU
law because of the legal uncertainty of such a fact-specific misuse approach and the
unforeseeable weakening of IP rights in favor of the competition process, especially
in a fiction like the Internal Market of the EU. The misuse doctrine “arose to restrain
practices that did not in themselves violate any law, but that drew anticompetitive
strength from the patent right, and thus were deemed to be contrary to public
policy.” 39 The policy rationale was that the misuse doctrine would prevent the IP
owner from using the IP right to obtain benefits beyond those granted by statute.
While the doctrine “has evolved separately from the antitrust laws ... it is used to
attack patent licensing practices that are claimed to be undesirable from a public
policy standpoint.” 40 If successful, a misuse defense renders the patent unenforceable
against anyone until the misuse has been eliminated and the effects on the
marketplace have been purged.
As a general rule, the misuse doctrine has a broader scope than that of antitrust
laws, but the two overlap significantly as long as antitrust concerns such as market
structure, intent, and anticompetitive effect are met. Yet the misuse doctrine may limit
the validity of an IP right for behavior that does not rise to the level of an antitrust
violation. With the exception of non-economic reasons why the doctrine should apply
(e.g., fraud on the patent office), this effect represents a serious flaw in the doctrine
itself. 41 The test the Federal Circuit uses in its patent misuse jurisprudence examines

39

HMallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992)H.
See Roger B. Andewalt, Competition Policy and the Patent Misuse Doctrine, Remarks Before the
D.C. Bar Association, 1982 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 41, 42.
41
HZenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969)H.
40
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whether “the patentee has impermissibly broadened the physical or temporal scope of
the patent with anti-competitive effect.” 42
Two recent US cases shed light on the danger to eliminate competitive
products from a secondary market through the imposition of IP rights. Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. 43 referred to ink for printers.
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc. 44 involved the market-control
of remote controls for automatic garage doors. In each case the competitors of the
copyright owner at the secondary market first needed

access to the protected

computer program – only possible after circumvention of the technical precautionary
measures – and then needed the reproduction of the program in order to offer
competitive ink for printers or remote controls. The Sixth Circuit doubted the
copyrightability of the relevant computer programs. Where external factors like
technical specifications, hardware and software standards, programming practices, or
even efficiency considerations limit the choice of possible alternatives on the specific
computer program, the Sixth Circuit held that a merger (“merger doctrine” 45 ) of the
(non-copyrightable) idea and the expression occurs. As a result, there is no
copyrightability for the computer program. Unlike US law, the European copyright
regime does not have any merger or misuse doctrines that could facilitate flexibility in
the legal judgment of a case. This absence seems problematic in light of the relatively
shallow threshold, particularly for the protection of computer programs.

42

HWindsurfing Int’l Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 1986)H.
387 F. 3d 522, (6th Cir. 2004), reh’g denied, No. 03-5400, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 27422, reh’g, en
banc, denied, No. 03-5400, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3330.
44
381 F. 3d 1178, (Fed. Cir. 2004), reh’g, en banc, denied, No. 04-1118, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
27232, cert. denied, 544 U.S. 923 (2005).
45
See Baker v. Selden, 101 US 99 (1879).
43

7 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. Law 157

D. EU Law
I. First Principles
Due to institutional and structural impediments, EU law approaches the
interaction between IP and competition law through Article 82 EC. 46 The flexible
misuse doctrine cannot apply EU-wide because it is difficult for the varying national
intellectual property policies to be incorporated into the construction of Union-wide
competition law. In addition, it is impossible for the national courts to incorporate
European competition policy concerns into their national intellectual property laws.
Under Article 82 EC, competition law can only act in “exceptional
circumstances” to limit the lawful exercise of intellectual property rights. The
existence or the essence of intellectual property rights is not affected by the rules on
competition. 47 Under EU law today, the Volvo decision still defines the core principle
in applying Art. 82 EC to intellectual property matters: the refusal to license a right as
such does not constitute an abuse of a dominant position. 48 In other words, EU law,
like US law, disturbs the balance between the strong IP protection and competition
law in favor of the latter only in “exceptional circumstances.” Otherwise, the rule
remains that IP rights should be enforced.
II. Refusal to Deal Cases
In the Oscar Bronner 49 case the ECJ identified the required “exceptional
circumstances” as involving the following conditions: (1) that the refusal would be
likely to eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market by Oscar Bronner;

46

ANDREAS HEINEMANN, IMMATERIALGÜTERSCHUTZ IN DER WETTBEWERBSORDNUNG [INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET ORDER], 303 (2002).
47
INGE GOVAERE, THE USE AND ABUSE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EC LAW, 104 (1996).
48
Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK), Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211, ¶ 8.
49
Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GMBH v. Mediaprint Zeitungs-UND Zeitschriftenverlag GMBH, 1998
E.C.R. 1-7817.
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(2) that the refusal could not be objectively justified; and (3) that the service be
indispensable to carrying on Oscar Bronner’s business, in that there was no actual or
potential substitute.
The ECJ then ruled in its Magill decision 50 that to find an abuse there must be
three cumulative conditions: (i) the product to which the refusal to supply relates is an
indispensable input required for the marketing of a new product which the holder of
the IPR does not offer and for which there is a potential demand; (ii) there is no
justification for such refusal; and (iii) the dominant company reserves for itself a
secondary downstream market. 51 The ECJ’s first condition requires two elements: the
indispensability of the input and the failure of the IP right owner to exploit its rights to
offer the downstream product. The status of the second condition identified by the
ECJ depends on whether “objective justification” includes the reward for innovation
that underlies the grant of a monopoly under IP law. The third condition identified by
the ECJ is arguably the only condition inconsistent with the existence of the IP right,
since a refusal to license is inherent in the legal monopoly conferred by the IP right.
The ECJ noted that the dominant position of the TV companies was based on
the de facto monopoly enjoyed by them by force of circumstances over the
information used to compile listings for TV programs.52 The decision emphasized that
the true test of market dominance was possession of economic strength in a market
(i.e., the ability to behave independently of competitors and consumers 53 ). Yet that
test presupposes an economic analysis of market strength. If mere ownership of the IP
right occurs in conjunction with a de facto monopoly on a market, and that is
50
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sufficient to justify a finding of dominance, then the existence of ownership alone can
confer dominance.
In IMS Health, 54 the ECJ concluded that it is possible to interfere with the
specific subject matter of an IP right on the basis of Article 82 EC, imposing
compulsory licensing on the right holder when four special circumstances exist: (a)
the protected product or service must be indispensable for carrying on a particular
business; (b) the refusal would exclude any competition on the secondary market; (c)
the refusal prevents emergence of a new product for which there is potential consumer
demand; and (d) the refusal is not objectively justified. 55 In reaching this conclusion,
the ECJ stated that it was sufficient that “a potential market or even a hypothetical
market can be identified,” noting that these circumstances would occur when “the
products or services are indispensable in order to carry on a particular business and
where there is an actual demand for them on the part of undertakings which seek to
carry on the business for which they are indispensable”. 56 The consumers’ interest in
IMS Health did not consist in getting a new product, but in having a larger number of
competing supplies in the downstream service market to offer a comparable service
using the same brick structure. 57
In Microsoft, 58 the Commission examined the indispensability of interface
information against the existence of actual or potential substitutes. According to the
Commission, neither reverse engineering nor open industry standards nor the access
ensured by the communication licensing program created in the US were alternative
ways for Microsoft competitors to achieve interoperability of their products. The
54
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Commission advocates that “Microsoft’s refusal puts Microsoft’s competitors at a
strong disadvantage in the workgroup server operating system market, to an extent
where there is a risk of elimination of competition.” 59 Yet the crucial question for the
Commission seems to be, if the refusal to license reduces the incentives to innovate in
the whole industry. Microsoft’s incentives to innovate in the workgroup server
operating system will be reduced in case of non-disclosure because of the absence of
competitive pressure. The European case concentrated on the problems of server
software markets and integration of the media player into the operating system,
whereas the US case focused on the browser and the Java problem. 60 Due to these
differences, no further analysis of Microsoft is included here.
E. The Way of Converging the Two systems by Speaking the Same Language of
Law and Economics
I. Introduction
The above analysis demonstrating how the U.S.’s and E.U.’s law systems
approach the interface between IP and competition law with regard to refusal to deal
cases has shown one thing. Even if there are institutional, procedural and structural
differences, there is a language that can be similarly spoken by the US and EU courts.
This language consists of commonly understood legal terms and economic analysis. 61
The proposed common language that could be applied by the courts on both sides of
the Atlantic for refusal to deal cases includes two steps. First, the courts should
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examine if there is the “possibility of competition by substitution” 62 and a “de facto
monopoly on the downstream market” 63 . These two legal terms should be the first
two criteria for finding an anti-competitive abuse of IP rights. 65 The second step of
the proposed analysis consists of an economic balancing between the pro- and anticompetitive effects of the refusal of the IP owner to deal. 66
Especially now that both US and EU competition laws (Section 2 Sherman
Act and Art. 82 EC 67 ) seem to gravitate toward an economic-based approach, the
possibility of aligning the legal and economic language of the Supreme Court and the
ECJ seems more feasible than ever. This proposed common language is not only a
game with words, as its application to the hypothetical resolution of two current cases
before the ECJ and the US Supreme Court shows. 69 It is a method of communication
between the two legal systems; a way for them to see the same things similarly
through a common legal treatment. It is a method of converging two legal systems
that have the most developed IP and Antitrust laws. This convergence could bring
some legal certainty in this area of law, especially through the application of the
proposed two-step test. Finally, it would become an example for the resolution of
refusal to deal cases in IP and competition law for other developing countries.
II. The Current Discussion in the EU for the Application of Art. 82 EC on an
“Economic Approach” Basis
The EU Commission has begun lately to reflect internally on the policy
underlying Article 82 EC and the way in which the Commission should enforce that
62

See Part E. IV.
See Part E. V.
64
See Part E. V.
65
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policy. 70 The resulting paper suggests a framework for the continued rigorous
enforcement of Article 82. The framework builds on the economic analysis used in
recent cases and sets out one possible methodology for the assessment of some
common abusive practices. An economic-based approach to the application of Article
82 implies that the assessment of each specific case will not be undertaken based on
the form that a particular business practice takes (for example, exclusive dealing,
tying, etc.). Rather, the approach will be based on the assessment of the anticompetitive effects generated by business behavior. This implies that competition law
authorities will need to identify a competitive harm and assess the extent a
negative effect on consumers is potentially outweighed by efficiency gains.
Identifying a competitive harm requires finding a consistent business behavior based
on sound economics and supported by facts and empirical evidence. An economicsbased approach will naturally lend itself to a “rule of reason”

approach

to

competition policy since careful consideration of the specifics of each case is
needed; therefore, this approach is likely to be especially difficult under per se rules.
In an effects-based approach, the focus is on the use of well-established
economic analysis. The ultimate goal is to focus on the important competitive harms
while preserving and encouraging efficiency. The economic approach to Article 82
EC is supposed to provide a flexible framework that fosters increased productivity
and growth to the benefits of consumers. The standard for assessing if a given practice
is detrimental to competition or if it is a legitimate tool of competition should be
determined from the effects of the practice on consumers.
Moving from a form-based to an effects-based approach has important
implications for procedure. While under a form-based approach, it is enough to verify
70
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(i) that a firm is dominant and (ii) that a certain form of behavior is practiced, an
effects-based approach requires verification of competitive harm. To verify
competitive harm, the authority must analyze the practice in question to see whether
there is a consistent and verifiable economic account of significant competitive harm.
This verification should be both based on sound economic analysis and grounded on
fact; however, it is necessary to ensure the consistency of the treatment of the various
practices that produce the same anticompetitive effect. This also helps enhance the
predictability and, consequently, the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement.
Once a competitive harm has been identified and the relevant facts established,
the next step should be to see if pro-competitive effects might serve as a
counterbalance. Again, an economic approach first identifies the nature of the benefit
for competition and the facts that need to be established. It is only after these steps
that a proper balance can be assessed. It is obvious from the above-mentioned that the
general framework, under which Art. 82 EC is applied, is quickly approaching the
way Section 2 Sherman Act is applied. EU competition law distances itself from the
normative approach, encompassing the principles of “objective justification” and
“proportionality”, which were mainly followed, until recently, to apply Art. 82 EC on
competitive conduct. 71

Presently, the law seems willing to follow the economic

effects-based approach of the US law.
III. The Courts Should Finally Speak a Common Legal and Economic Language
As shown above, the courts on each side of the Atlantic have not managed to
use a common legal nor economic language; although it is possible given that the
basic application of concepts such as innovation, competition, and indispensability are
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seemingly the same. 72 In particular, the Supreme Court and the ECJ have omitted
sound economic analysis, which tends to be internationally understood and
recognized, from its decisions. Moreover, the two court systems use a legal language
with terms that cannot be understood nor adopted by the other. For example, the ECJ
ruled in IMS Health that “the refusal in question must concern a product that is
indispensable for the production of a new product for which there is an unsatisfied
consumer demand.” Instead, it could rule “the refusal in question must concern a
product that creates a de facto monopoly for the competition by substitution in the
downstream market and thus causes anticompetitive effects in the market.” 73 The
substitutions of “indispensability” with “de facto monopoly on the downstream
market” or “new product in the downstream market” with “possibility of competition
by substitution” commonly conceptualize objectively these ideas both in the US and
EU. The next section will analyze the legal terms proposed and commonly understood
by US and EU enforcers and their definitions.
IV. The Distinction Between Competition by Substitution and Competition by
Imitation and Its Implications
In its Guidelines on the Transfer Technology Regulation (TTBER) 74 , the
Commission has sufficiently made clear that IP rights and competition law coincide in
promoting innovation and dynamic competition by excluding imitation. 75 The
objective of the IP right is to prevent others from imitating so as to encourage them to
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compete by substitution. Intellectual property protection reacts to the phenomenon of
copying intangible goods by restricting the freedom to compete by imitation, but does
not exclude the possibility of developing a superior intangible good that would
compete with the prior good (i.e., competition by substitution). Dynamic efficiency,
creating incentives for innovation and competitive behavior, is enhanced by
competition by substitution and requires the exclusion of competition by imitation. 76
Two decisions of the ECJ illustrate the distinction between competition by
substitution and competition by imitation . The competitor who simply intends to
imitate the achievements of the right holder does not deserve any protection by
competition law (IMS Health), whereas, a competitor would be prevented from
placing a new product in the market without the grant of the license (Magill). It is
difficult however to imagine that the ECJ’s “new product rule” would work in a case,
where the IP system is not deficient but rather external circumstances prevent the
competitor from placing a new product in the market. In these situations, such as
cases involving software licensing agreements, competition by substitution (i.e., a
new product) is not hindered by the refusal to grant the license 77 , but rather by the
lock-in effect and possible network effects in the given market. Thus if there are
network and lock-in effects limiting any market access, the examination requires a
concrete market analysis.
Network effects arise when the value of a network increases with the number
of its users. A single firm, perhaps because it is the first mover, may become the only
supplier of certain products or services because of the value of compatibility or
interoperability. Consumers are more likely to remain with the established network
because of their sunk costs (sometimes referred to as “lock-in”), and the suppliers of
76
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complementary products will tailor those products to the established network while
they resist preparing products for would-be challengers. In that event, network
dominance itself becomes a formidable barrier to entry. In Europe, the Commission
stated that where a de facto industry standard emerges such as the software or the
phone service industry,
the main concern will then be to ensure that these standards are as open as
possible and applied in a clear non-discriminatory manner. To avoid
elimination of competition in the relevant market(s), access to the standard
must be possible for third parties on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. 78
The ECJ uses a concept of innovation which applies to some cases but not
others. 79 If the net effect of compelling a license is “a positive level of innovation of
the whole industry, then intervening is considered welfare enhancing”. 80 Currently,
protection has moved upstream to give right holders control over a particular
innovation opportunity in exchange for contributing the insight that created it.
Therefore, competition law must be structured to prevent right holders from
leveraging control over the innovation opportunity in one product market into control
over innovation opportunities in other product markets.
The first criterion of “possibility of competition by substitution”, which is
proposed here, presupposes that there is no technical or de facto possibility of
substitution. For example, the copyright-protected TV-listings in the Magill case
could not be substituted. A substitution is especially more difficult by copyrights than
by other rights, such as patents. A bottleneck situation can result not only due to the
technical impossibility of substitution, but also because a substitute is economically
78
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impossible. This does not depend on subjective intentions but rather on objective
economic criteria. The development of a profitable substitute must be objectively
impossible in order to find abuse of IP rights.
V. The Leveraging Element and De Facto Monopoly
By refusing to license the intellectual property right, the dominant company is
not merely using the right in the market for the product or service, with which the
right is primarily concerned, but the company is also using the right to obtain leverage
or to protect itself from competition in another market. 81 This so-called “monopoly
leveraging” 82 applies in two-market situations where a competitor in the downstream
market gains control over a necessary input and does not offer a better or a cheaper
product in the downstream market, but only uses its power to harm consumers in that
market by shutting out its competitors. 83
The main function of the IP rights in such cases is to exclude third parties
from the secondary market, which stands closest to the primary market. 84 When a
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dominant firm tries to transfer its market power to another neighboring market to
shield against any competition, there is certainly an influence on the competition
process. In the primary market, the exclusionary effect of the IP right takes
precedence over competition law. There should be control over the IP right through
competition law only when the IP owner prevents access to a secondary market.
Without acknowledging that the IMS Health case was a typical, leveraging case, the
ECJ ruled that a refusal to license IMS Health could very possibly lead to a total cutoff of a secondary market. 85
The competitor must also require the IP right in order to access the secondary
market. The second criterion, proposed here, is the “de facto monopoly on a
downstream market” referring to the phenomenon, where the IP right cannot be
substituted and blocks access to another market. The abuse in this case consists of
monopoly leveraging, the transfer of market power to other markets. 86 When there are
one or two markets related to each other, the formula of “functional
interchangeability” applies. Only if the product of the competitor is not functionally
interchangeable with that of the dominant firm, can one speak about two separate
markets. There should be a case-by-case market analysis. The switching costs,
analyzed by way of thorough market analysis including eventual network and lock-in
effects, will be the decisive factor in assessing the indispensability of the de facto
monopoly standard. 87
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VI. Economic Balancing
An economic analysis at this level should include a balance between the ex
post allocative efficiency gains, which can be realized by mandating access, with the
ex ante dynamic efficiency gains, which can be protected by refusing access. 88 On the
one hand, requiring a dominant firm holding an IP right, as an essential facility, to
share it with one or several competitors will stimulate competition in downstream
markets, thus promoting ex post (allocative) efficiency. On the other hand, mandatory
sharing may reduce the return of the IP right holder and thus decrease its ex ante
incentives to invest and compete dynamically. 89 At this point, a difficult and
controversial, among economists, economic balancing between the pro- and anticompetitive effects of a refusal to deal should take place. 90 There must be an overall
balancing, especially taking into consideration the seriousness of hindering access to
the secondary market.
VII. Hypothetical resolution of cases through the common language
This section of the article will examine how the above-mentioned ideas apply
in practice. Specifically, the article proposes a hypothetical resolution to two cases
before the ECJ and the Supreme Court through the use of the proposed common
language. These cases are both fairly recent and have caused a great deal of
discussion.
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1. IMS Health
In IMS Health 91 , the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled, on a reference,
under what circumstances a dominant company’s refusal to grant a copyright license
will amount to the abuse of that company’s dominant position. In this case, two
German Companies, IMS Health (“IMS”) and NDC Health (“NDC”) both collected
various data on pharmaceutical sales and prescriptions. The data provided by IMS to
pharmaceutical laboratories was formatted in a particular structure and was distributed
free of charge. In the late 1980’s, a director of IMS left to set up another company,
which sold similar data to that sold by IMS and which worked with very similar
structures to IMS. NDC subsequently acquired this company. In an action before the
local courts in Germany, it was held that the IMS structure system for data collection
was protected by copyright. However, the national court held that IMS could not
refuse to grant a copyright license to NDC if such refusal would, under EU law,
amount to an abuse of a dominant position. The national court referred certain
questions to the ECJ regarding the circumstances under which such behavior would
constitute an abuse of a dominant position.
The first requirement of the “possibility of competition by substitution” is
present here since in practice there is a competitor’s inability to duplicate the product.
IMS had acquired a normal industry standard through its brick structure. Without
access to this structure, there was no technical or economical possibility for NDC to
compete. 92 However, the second requirement of “de facto monopoly on the
downstream market” seems to be absent here. There is no other secondary market in
this case, not even for a different product. 93 The brick-structure does not prevent the
91
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access to another downstream market because there is only one market, which is for
pharmaceutical products. Since the second requirement for finding an abuse of IP
rights is absent, there would be no need to proceed to the third requirement, which is
an economic balancing of the pro- and anti-competitive effects of the refusal;
therefore, the refusal is legitimate.
If we applied the above-mentioned analysis on the IMS Health case of the
ECJ, there would be no possibility of an antitrust violation. 94 Even if one could
identify two different markets, one in the sales-data of the pharmaceuticals95 and the
other in the structure of the databank, the requirements would not be met to excuse an
antitrust violation. A flexible solution of such a problematic situation, taking into
account IMS Health’s huge investments in the structure for at least 30 years, could
eventually emerge, not in competition law, but in copyright law, through a narrow
application of the idea/expression distinction at the copyrightability level. A similar
solution is offered in the US law by the merger and scene-a-faire doctrines.
2. Verizon v. Trinko
Before analyzing this case, the article will briefly reexamine the facts of the
case.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 imposes upon an incumbent
local exchange carrier (LEC) the obligation to share its telephone network
with competitors, (see 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)), including the duty to provide
access to individual network elements on an “unbundled” basis, (see §
251(c)(3)). New entrants, so-called competitive LECs, combine and resell
these unbundled network elements (UNEs). Petitioner Verizon
Communications Inc., the incumbent LEC in New York State, has signed
interconnection agreements with rivals such as AT&T, as § 252 obliges it
to do, detailing the terms on which it will make its network elements
available. Respondent Trinko LLP, a New York City law firm, was a local
telephone service customer of AT&T. The day after Verizon entered its
94
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consent decree with the FCC, respondent filed a complaint in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, on behalf of itself and a class
of similarly situated customers. The complaint alleged that Verizon had
filled rivals’ orders on a discriminatory basis as part of an anticompetitive
scheme to discourage customers from becoming or remaining customers
of competitive LECs, thus impeding the competitive LECs’ ability to enter
and compete in the market for local telephone service. Complainant
sought damages and injunctive relief for violation of § 2 of the Sherman
Act, pursuant to the remedy provisions of §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton
Act. 96
The peculiarity of this case is the existence of a regulatory scheme
(Telecommunication Act), which Justice Scalia assumed was sufficient for the
resolution of this case and avoided any further antitrust analysis. Apart from the
Telecommunication Act’s regulation, it would be interesting to see how the common
legal language proposed here could be applied in this case. The first requirement of
“possibility of competition by substitution” is present here, since competitor is unable
in practice to duplicate the interconnection service. As the decision clearly states, “the
services allegedly withheld are not otherwise marketed or available to the public.”
Without access to Verizon’s platform, there was no technical or economical
possibility for AT&T to compete. Moreover, the second requirement of “de facto
monopoly on the downstream market” is present here. As the decision notes, “[t]he
sharing obligation imposed by the Telecommunication Act created ‘something brand
new’ – ‘the wholesale market for leasing network elements.’” 97 In other words, there
is another secondary downstream market, in this case, where competition is de facto
prohibited because of the monopoly of Verizon in the upstream market. The Court
then should proceed to the third requirement and engage in an economic balancing of
the pro- and anti-competitive effects of Verizon’s refusal to share interconnection
services. The economic analysis would probably result in an order for Verizon to
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share its services with AT&T and several other competitors since that would stimulate
competition in the downstream market for leasing network elements. The stimulation
of competition would promote ex post allocative efficiency, outweighing any shortterm ex ante dynamic efficiency gains, which can be protected by refusing access to
Verizon’s services.
F. Conclusion
The EC competition law is becoming increasingly economically orientated
with the application of Art. 82 EC approaching US law, where an element of
anticompetitive conduct must be present. The idea of an economics-based antitrust
regime is no longer a greatly controversial concept. This approach facilitates
objectivity, predictability, and transparency, although even economic theory does not
have all the answers and probably never will. 98
Competition law and IP law are converging in their aims of ensuring an
optimum balance between access to markets and protection of invention. A model
with narrower IP protection and strong competition policy intervening only under
exceptional circumstances suggests an alternative model for innovation. The IP rights
are thus not protected in abstracto, but as a substantial medium of competition. If the
advantages of the IP system are outweighed by disadvantages on the competition by
substitution, only negative effects of competition by imitation remain. If the
resolution of an absence of any competition is offered either by IP internally, like in
the US through the doctrines of merger and misuse, or externally through competition
law, like in EU law, the resolution becomes the matter of a systematic approach. The
best solution would consist of limiting the IP right to its appropriate scope through a
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flexible IP-related approach, such as the misuse doctrine, relying on the
complementary goals of IP and competition law.
However, an American-type synthesis of intellectual property and competition
law is more difficult in Europe because the European Union currently possesses a
Union-wide competition law in contrast to mostly national intellectual property laws.
As a result, it is more difficult for the varying national intellectual property policies to
be incorporated into the construction of Union-wide competition law. It is also
difficult, albeit not impossible, for the national courts to incorporate European
competition policy concerns into their national intellectual property laws. These
impediments to the harmonization of intellectual property law with competition law in
Europe mean that the interactions of these two sets of laws are likely to produce a less
than efficient result.
It is clear that this use of common legal language between US and EU law can
also be used to describe cases involving both IP and competition law. Common terms
may be used to describe and resolve cases where IP law has to take into account
competition policy issues. These situations are numerous, including cases referring to
the misuse, merger, and scene-a-faire doctrines and functionality problems.
In the case of network effects, where competition by substitution is not
possible, the right holder’s freedom to license would result in overbroad protection.
The IP right does not have the capacity to promote dynamic competition, and the law
has to impose a duty to license the IP right to competitors at reasonable fees. In the
rare market situations where IP protection does not reach its goal of promoting
dynamic efficiency, a duty to deal should be accepted so as to guarantee at least
allocative efficiency. From an economic point of view, compulsory licensing should
occur if exploitation by the licensee has allocative advantages in comparison to
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exploitation by the right owner, and there is no de facto competition by imitation
anymore. 99
Even in the market for the copyright of the brick structure, the copyright was
not the cause of IMS Health’s dominant position. The problem is that the lock-in
effect excludes any other method of collecting data from the relevant market. When a
company holds market power, this company by definition will not feel pressure to
innovate. Also, it may attempt to create barriers for potential competitors and forget to
improve its own products by continuing to introduce superior technology in the
market. Still, competition may be restored by allowing imitation. Although the
exclusive right is not the cause of market power, the competition problem may be
cured by restricting the exercise of the exclusive right. 100
The rationale for the imposition of a duty to deal under these circumstances is
not to create competition in the market subject to intellectual property protection
because exclusivity is within the statutory monopoly conferred by the patent or
copyright statutes. Rather, it is to allow competition in complementary markets that
are not within the scope of the patent or copyright monopoly. Patent and copyright
owners will continue to be able to fully exploit the monopoly conferred by those
grants, and they will be limited only in attempts to extend that monopoly beyond the
proper scope of the grant. Therefore, the holder of a dominant position must make
considerable efforts to keep the barriers to entry into the neighboring markets as low
as possible. The solution is to keep the relevant markets as open as possible. 101 That
result would best advance the principal goal of the antitrust laws, to increase
competition and maximize consumer welfare; a goal that is hardly inconsistent with
the goals of patent or copyright law.
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